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NOTE
A CASE FOR ACTUAL INNOCENCE
Matthew Aglialoro*
In Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner facing
execution could not obtain federal habeas corpus relief for a claim of
actual innocence, unless that claim was complemented by an indepen-
dent constitutional violation.  In the course of its opinion, the Court as-
sumed, without explicitly recognizing, that a truly persuasive case of
actual innocence would render a defendant’s execution unconstitutional.
This assumption has caused confusion in the lower courts, and has led to
debate over the current status of freestanding claims of actual innocence.
Due to developments in DNA technology, as well as the insufficiency of
state-court remedies, the time has come for the Court to explicitly recog-
nize a freestanding claim of actual innocence.  In doing so, the Court
will have to articulate the constitutional basis for entertaining these ap-
plications for habeas corpus relief.  Although scholars have made sev-
eral suggestions, both prudential and legal considerations suggest that a
court should rely upon the Eighth Amendment.  Only the Eighth Amend-
ment offers sufficient protection for defendants raising freestanding
claims of actual innocence as the basis for habeas relief.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a prisoner sitting on death row for a triple homicide.  After
receiving a fair trial, represented by a competent attorney in state court,
the defendant appealed his conviction through every state avenue availa-
ble to no avail.  Imagine then, newly discovered evidence calls the defen-
dant’s conviction into doubt.  Having exhausted all of his appeals at the
state level, the prisoner applies for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, contending that his imprisonment is in
violation of the Constitution.1  Having received a fair trial in state court,
the prisoner enters with no claim other than his innocence.  Should the
court grant relief and overturn the state conviction?
In Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner’s
claim of actual innocence in the face of execution does not entitle him to
habeas corpus relief, unless that actual innocence claim was comple-
mented by another claim asserting an independent constitutional viola-
tion.2  Although Herrera alleged that his imprisonment in light of new
evidence proving his innocence amounted to violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Court determined that such violations, if
they existed at all, occurred only after his state criminal proceedings.
Because the constitutional violations did not impact the fairness of his
state court trial, the violations could only serve as the “basis upon which
a habeas petitioner may have an independent constitutional claim consid-
ered on the merits.”3  Indeed, the Court emphasized that “[f]ew rulings
would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide for fed-
eral habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence.”4
In rejecting Herrera’s freestanding claim of actual innocence, how-
ever, the Court did not completely dismiss the possibility that claims of
actual innocence could serve as the basis of federal habeas corpus relief.
1 Section 2254 grants federal courts and the justices therein jurisdiction to entertain an
application for a writ of habeas corpus from a prisoner in state custody, where the prisoner
contends “that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.”  28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2011).  A writ of habeas corpus cannot be granted under this
provision, however, unless the defendant is able to overcome a substantial number of substan-
tive and procedural bars. See id. § 2254(b)–(e).
2 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 (1993) (“[T]he existence merely of newly
discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal
habeas corpus.”).
3 Id. at 416.
4 Id. at 401.  The Court’s fear seems to be based in disrupting underlying notions of
federalism.  Further, states have a strong interest in finality of judgments within their respec-
tive courts and federal courts should not relitigate final state judgments. See Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993).
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Quite the contrary, in dismissing Herrera’s claim the Court “assume[d],
for the sake of argument . . . that in a capital case a truly persuasive
demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the
execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal habeas re-
lief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.”5  Her-
rera’s claim of innocence, the Court stated, “falls far short of that which
would have to be made in order to trigger the sort of constitutional claim
which we have assumed, arguendo, to exist.”6
Although the Court’s assumption was merely dicta, it generated
widespread debate over the viability of actual innocence claims.7  A
closer look at the varying opinions in Herrera also reveal that even
though the holding of the case was announced by five members of the
court, a different majority of justices signaled support for the assumption
in the opinion of the court.  Overall, a larger majority of the Court’s
members suggested that the execution of a defendant with a truly persua-
sive case of actual innocence would be unconstitutional, even in the ab-
sence of another claim.  In a separate concurrence, Justice White
explicitly assumed that a truly persuasive claim of actual innocence
would entitle a state prisoner to federal habeas corpus relief.8  Justice
Blackmun, joined by two other Justices indicated full support of a claim
of actual innocence serving as the basis for federal habeas corpus relief.9
Indeed, the only justices that explicitly rejected the idea that a truly per-
suasive case of actual innocence could serve as the basis for federal
habeas corpus relief were Justices Scalia and Thomas.  Justice Scalia’s
entire concurrence was devoted to refuting the idea that actual innocence
could provide independent relief.10
5 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417–19.
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., William D. Darden, Herrera v. Collins: The Right of Innocence: An Unrec-
ognized Constitutional Privilege, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 258 (1994); Kathleen Cava Boyd, The
Paradox of “Actual Innocence” in Federal Habeas Corpus After Herrera v. Collins, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 479 (1994); Michael J. Muskat, Substantive Justice and State Interests in the After-
math of Herrera v. Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the Resolution of Bare Innocence
Claims Through State Postconviction Remedies, 75 TEX. L. REV. 131 (1996).
8 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (“I assume that a persuasive
showing of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial . . . would render unconstitutional the execution
of petitioner.”).  Although Justice O’Connor joined the majority, she also wrote a concurring
opinion, in which she made a similar assumption. See id. at 427 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“Nowhere does the Court state that the Constitution permits the execution of an actually
innocent person.”).
9 See id. at 430–31 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“We really are being asked to decide
whether the Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has been validly convicted and
sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly discovered evidence. . . .
I do not see how the answer can be anything but ‘yes.’”).
10 See id. at 427–28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“There is no basis in text, tradition, or even
in contemporary practice (if that were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to de-
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It may seem obvious that executing an innocent prisoner would be
unconstitutional, even if innocence was not proven after a full and fair
jury trial.  In reality, innocence jurisprudence is far more complicated.
To start, there is a significant difference between actual innocence and
legal innocence.  The former has played a very limited role in cases in-
volving review of a defendant’s conviction.  Rather, courts focus on a
prisoner’s legal innocence on collateral review, analyzing whether the
state provided sufficient process during the defendant’s trial.
Nevertheless, Herrera left the door open, whether intentional or not,
for courts to give greater consideration to actual innocence.  As discussed
above, even though the majority rejected Herrera’s Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment claims,11 the Court did not completely foreclose a
defendant from claiming actual innocence.  Further, in the twenty years
since Herrera, the Supreme Court has articulated only vague and con-
flicting opinions regarding freestanding claims of actual innocence as the
basis for habeas corpus relief.
This Note examines the plausibility of actual innocence claims serv-
ing as the basis for habeas corpus review. Part I begins with a brief ex-
planation of innocence in the context of freestanding claims of actual
innocence.  As noted, courts distinguish between actual and legal inno-
cence, a distinction which makes a difference for prisoners seeking relief.
In Part II, I argue that it is time for the Court to rethink its decision in
Herrera.  For one, the Court relied on the availability of state clemency
as an avenue of last resort for prisoners claiming actual innocence.  How-
ever, state clemency is rarely granted, and the decision to grant clemency
is largely unrelated to a defendant’s innocence. In addition, the last
twenty years has seen significant advances in the use of DNA evidence
to exonerate the wrongly convicted.  When Herrera was decided, the use
of DNA evidence to exonerate prisoners was almost unheard of.  Indeed,
not once did the Court in Herrera discuss the possibility that DNA evi-
dence could serve as the basis for a freestanding claim of actual inno-
cence.  This may suggest that the Court was unable to conceptualize a
truly persuasive case of actual innocence, and therefore refrained from
extending itself further than it had to on the question.  But DNA evi-
dence, unlike any evidence preceding it, can provide near-definitive
proof of innocence. As such, the Court should consider the potential of
DNA evidence in supporting actual innocence claims.  Support for this
mand judicial consideration of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after
conviction.”).
11 Id. at 416 (majority opinion) (“Federal habeas review of state convictions has tradi-
tionally been limited to claims of constitutional violations occurring in the course of the un-
derlying state criminal proceedings.”) (emphasis added).
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can be found in recent habeas jurisprudence, which raises significant
questions about the staying power of Herrera.
If the Court were to reconsider Herrera, a freestanding claim of
actual innocence would need to serve as the independent basis for relief.
Under this interpretation, § 2254 would require the Court to articulate a
constitutional ground for entertaining the petitioner’s habeas corpus ap-
plication.  That is, the Court would need to determine what constitutional
violation is implicated by the detention and execution of a person claim-
ing innocence.  Part III analyzes several potential constitutional viola-
tions discussed in the current scholarship.  Although each of these
choices warrants thoughtful consideration, they ultimately all suffer defi-
ciencies that make them unreliable.  In Part IV, I recommend that courts
look to the Eighth Amendment as the source that courts may rely upon
when granting habeas corpus applications for prisoners with freestanding
claims of innocence.  In addition to not suffering from the same deficien-
cies as the constitutional provisions discussed in Part III, the Eighth
Amendment’s history and current understanding support freestanding
claims of actual innocence as a basis for entertaining habeas corpus
petitions.
I. AN ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIM EXPLAINED
Critical to understanding freestanding claims of actual innocence is
the distinction between actual innocence and legal innocence.  A defen-
dant seeking relief based on legal innocence, or “legal insufficiency,”
contends that the prosecutor has failed to produce sufficient evidence at a
criminal trial to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.12  Conversely,
a defendant seeking relief based on actual innocence contends that he or
she did not commit the crime alleged, regardless of the judge or jury’s
finding of legal innocence.13  Unlike a legal innocence, actual innocence
focuses entirely on the factual predicate of the offense.14
12 See Nicholas Berg, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Col-
lins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 122 (2005); Jennifer Gwynne Case, How Wide Should the
Actual Innocence Gateway Be? An Attempt to Clarify the Miscarriage of Justice Exception for
Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 669, 677–78 (2008).
13 See Lee Kovarsky, Custodial and Collateral Process: A Response to Professor Gar-
rett, CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 1, 14 (2013), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/07/Ko-
varskyformatted.pdf.  Some scholars separate innocence into more than two categories. See,
e.g., Cathleen Burnett, Constructions of Innocence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 971, 975–79 (2002);
William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 331 n.4 (1995); Mar-
garet Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 456 (2001).  Others
argue that the categorization of innocence is irrelevant. See Keith A. Findley, Defining Inno-
cence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2011) (arguing that distinction between actual and factual
innocence fails to capture the legal standards governing the two categories).
14 See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 615 (1998) (“[A]ctual innocence means
factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Of course, a defendant may raise an actual innocence claim in con-
junction with other procedural claims.  In such a case, the prisoner ulti-
mately seeks to prove legal insufficiency, but relies partially on evidence
of his actual innocence.  The Court has held that the convicted prisoner
may receive habeas corpus relief if the constitutional violation more
likely than not resulted in a wrongful conviction.15  When a defendant
claims actual innocence independent and unaccompanied by any other
claim, though, it is referred to as a “freestanding” actual innocence
claim.16  For claims of freestanding actual innocence, a prisoner seeks
only to rebut the factual findings of the crime for which he was
convicted.17
A federal habeas corpus court may review a state court’s finding of
legal guilt based on a claim that the state court failed to provide constitu-
tionally sufficient process.18  For example, under Strickland, a state’s
failure to provide a defendant effective assistance of counsel would cast
doubt on the validity of the state court’s guilty verdict.19  A Strickland
claim calls into question the defendant’s legal guilt because it implicates
a potential flaw in the trial process that is constitutionally required to find
a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.20  In such a case, a defen-
dant’s actual innocence is only tangentially related to the Strickland
claim.  That is, although actual innocence may provide a basis under
which a defendant can show that the outcome of his trial would have
been different but for the procedural error, it is neither sufficient nor
necessary to do so succeed on a Strickland claim. 21
15 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326–27 (1995) (“Accordingly, we hold that the
Carrier “probably resulted” standard rather than the more stringent Sawyer standard must gov-
ern the miscarriage of justice inquiry when a petitioner who has been sentenced to death raises
a claim of actual innocence to avoid a procedural bar to the consideration of the merits of his
constitutional claims.”).
16 See Gregg Walters, The Freestanding Claim of Innocence—The Supreme Court of
Illinois Breaks Lockstep but Leaves Material Issues Unresolved, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 763, 763 n.5
(1998) (“A ‘freestanding claim of innocence’ is a claim seeking relief based on newly discov-
ered [evidence] that is not being used to supplement an assertion of a constitutional violation
in the trial that led to conviction.”).
17 See John M. Leventhal, A Survey of Federal and State Courts’ Approaches to a Con-
stitutional Right of Actual Innocence: Is There a Need for a State Constitutional Right in New
York in the Aftermath of CPL § 440.10(G-1)?, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1453, 1455 (2013) (“Claims of
actual innocence arise when a petitioner asserts that he is factually innocent of the convicted
crime in post-conviction litigation.”).
18 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2011).
19 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (“In a long line of
cases . . . this Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, and is
needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial.”).
20 Id.
21 See id. at 694. Defendant does not need to show that he was actually innocent in order
to succeed under Strickland.  Rather, a defendant need only show that there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different. Id.
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Under Herrera, however, a federal habeas court could not entertain
an application for habeas corpus from a prisoner with new evidence that
tended to show his innocence, because evidence of actual innocence, by
itself, does not entitle a prisoner to habeas corpus relief.22  Unlike legal
innocence, which implicates constitutionally-required processes, the de-
termination of actual innocence is largely a factual inquiry, a function
traditionally completed by the state court.23  Because “federal habeas
courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the
Constitution—not to correct errors of fact,”24 actual innocence is not
seen as a proper basis of habeas corpus relief on collateral review.  Al-
though one may argue that newly discovered evidence calls into question
the sufficiency of the evidence produced at trial, and thus implicates the
defendant’s legal innocence, sufficiency review only extends to evidence
already on the record at the time of trial.25  Quite counterintuitively then,
a prisoner may have a better chance at habeas corpus relief when pursu-
ing a claim implicating procedural deficiency, such as ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, even if a highly factual inquiry is involved, than when
pursuing a fairly straightforward, albeit substantive claim of actual
innocence.26
Nevertheless, the Court in Herrera failed to completely foreclose
the possibility of habeas corpus relief for freestanding claims of actual
innocence in capital cases.27  A sufficiently persuasive claim of actual
innocence would presumably serve as the underlying constitutional claim
required for a defendant to receive relief.  In other words, a freestanding
claim of innocence that is overwhelmingly persuasive, but unaccompa-
nied by a claim of legal insufficiency might qualify a defendant for
habeas relief.
II. CASE FOR ACTUAL INNOCENCE
In Herrera, the Court only assumed that a truly persuasive case of
actual innocence would provide a basis for habeas corpus relief.  In re-
jecting Herrera’s claim of actual innocence, the Court relied heavily on
the availability of state clemency as a stopgap for faulty verdicts.  The
reliance on state clemency proceedings, however, is improper for several
reasons.  In addition, the Court’s mere assumption that a persuasive case
of actual innocence could serve as the basis for habeas corpus relief
22 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
23 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (noting that a federal habeas court
should only overturn factual determinations by a state court if they are objectively
unreasonable).
24 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400.
25 See id. at 401–02.
26 See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1638 (2008).
27 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417–19.
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could be a result of the Court’s inability to imagine a truly persuasive
case of innocence.  At the time Herrera was decided, DNA evidence was
rarely used as a tool for exoneration.  Today, truly persuasive exonerat-
ing evidence is more likely to become available after a state court con-
viction because of the reliability of DNA evidence.  This, along with the
insubstantiality of state court clemency, suggest that the Court should
reconsider its mere assumption and allow freestanding claims of actual
innocence to serve as the basis for habeas corpus relief.
A. Clemency Proceedings
The Court in Herrera failed to explicitly recognize a freestanding
actual innocence claim as the basis for habeas corpus relief.  In so doing,
the Court relied upon the existence of state clemency proceedings as the
primary outlet for prisoners with innocence claims.28  In fact, the major-
ity iterated that “[e]xecutive clemency has provided the ‘fail safe’ in our
criminal justice system.”29  Since Herrera, courts have relied on this rea-
soning to justify the denial of freestanding claims of actual innocence.30
In Royal v. Taylor, for example, the court dismissed petitioner’s ac-
tual innocence claim because “state clemency proceedings provide the
proper forum to pursue claims of actual innocence based on new facts.”31
There, the Fourth Circuit implied that federal habeas corpus relief for
actual innocence would only be proper if there were no state remedies
available.  Because Thomas Lee Royal Jr. had Virginia’s state clemency
proceedings available to him, there could be no habeas relief for actual
innocence.
Courts’ reliance on state clemency proceedings as a stopgap for
habeas corpus relief is improper for several reasons.  First, the chances of
receiving clemency are very slim.  In Virginia, where Royal was denied
habeas relief, only eight capital defendants have received clemency since
the death penalty was reenacted in 1976.32  In the same time period, 110
capital defendants were put to death.33  To shed greater light on the dis-
crepancy, Texas has executed 506 capital defendants since 1976 while
only granting clemency to two defendants.34  The slim chance of receiv-
28 See id. at 415–17.
29 Id. (citing KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST 131 (1989)).
30 See, e.g., Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1999); Coleman v. Thaler, 716
F.3d 895, 908 (5th Cir. 2013) (“And we have implied that . . . the availability of clemency in
Texas would defeat a freestanding innocence claim.”).
31 Royal, 188 F.3d at 243.
32 See State by State Database, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/state_by_state (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
33 Id.
34 Id.
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ing clemency cautions against relying on such a proceeding as the last
hope for the actually innocent.  Federal prisoners seeking executive
clemency face and equally minute chance of success, as only one defen-
dant has received clemency since the federal government reinstated the
death penalty in 1988.35
Second, the decision to grant clemency is based largely on politics,
rather than the defendant’s innocence. In a majority of states, the power
to grant clemency lies with the governor, who either has sole discretion
or may ignore recommendations from pardon boards. 36  As such, a pris-
oner’s innocence may take a backseat to political considerations.37  A
prominent example of political aspirations undermining an executive’s
decision on a clemency appeal occurred during the 1992 Presidential pri-
mary election.  In the winter of 1992, President Clinton, then Governor
of Arkansas, refused to issue an order of executive clemency to prevent
the execution of convicted murderer Rickey Ray Rector.38  Mr. Rector
was convicted and sentenced to death in 1982 for the murder of two
individuals, one of whom was a police officer; after shooting the officer,
Mr. Rector shot himself in the head, destroying part of his brain in the
process.39  The court upheld Mr. Rector’s death sentence over the objec-
tions of defense lawyers who claimed Mr. Rector’s impairment made
him ineligible for the death penalty.40  After exhausting all avenues of
appeal, Mr. Rector’s defense team sought clemency.  President Clinton
refused to grant clemency, and many argued that doing so was a way for
the electorate to view him as tough on crime in the face of a tough pri-
mary and general election.41  In further proof of Mr. Rector’s incapacity,
35 See Federal Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/federal-death-penalty?scid=29&did=147#statutes (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
36 See Clemency Process by State, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/clemency (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). See, e.g., Cary Aspinwall, Governor
Denies Clemency for Oklahoma Death-Row Inmate, TULSA WORLD, June 13, 2013, http://
www.tulsaworld.com/archives/governor-denies-clemency-for-oklahoma-death-row-inmate/ar-
ticle_773975dc-260a-5c82-8c6a-5013cf8c2a87.html (noting that Governor Fallin of Oklahoma
denied clemency to Brian D. Davis, despite a recommendation from the Pardon and Parole
Board recommending to commute his sentence by a vote of four to one); Texas Man Executed
After Clemency Denied, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 20, 2009, 2:28:28 AM), http://www.nbcnews.
com/id/34041283/#.Unhv77_aZUQ (noting Texas Governor Perry’s denial of clemency over
the Parole Board’s recommendation to commute Robert Lee Thompson’s sentence to life in
prison).
37 See, e.g., Evelyn Nieves, Schwarzenegger Clemency Denial Called Politically Safe,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/
13/AR20051213.html.
38 Peter Applebome, Arkansas Execution Raises Questions on Governor’s Politics, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1992, § 1, at 8.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.; see also Alexander Nguyen, Bill Clinton’s Death Penalty Waffle, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Dec. 19, 2001, available at http://prospect.org/article/bill-clintons-death-penalty-
waffle (noting that President Clinton started to change his views on the death penalty after
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supporters point to Mr. Rector’s last meal, which included pecan pie
uneaten by Mr. Rector because he believed that he could save it for after
his execution.42
Aside from political pressures, governors often apply their personal
views in clemency cases, views that are inconsistent with our legal sys-
tem.  Even if governors familiarize themselves with the facts of a partic-
ular proceeding, their ability to interpret and apply the law is far from
unimpeachable, especially since governors are not experts on the law.43
In some cases, governors consider extralegal factors, such as prayer or
God in their decision to grant or deny clemency.44
Last, a state governor’s decision to deny executive clemency would
not resolve a constitutional deficiency if one existed.  That is, if execut-
ing a defendant raising a persuasive case of actual innocence was uncon-
stitutional, the governor’s failure to grant clemency would not remedy
the constitutional violation.45  Indeed, one of the purposes of federal
habeas corpus under § 2254 is to ensure that state law has not violated
the Constitution.46  Therefore, the federal right of an actually innocent
person not to be executed exists whether or not the state provides relief.
B. Technological Advancements Since Herrera
Although there are several scenarios that can lead a defendant to
raise a freestanding innocence claim, the discovery of new DNA evi-
dence is one of the more persuasive scenarios based on its accuracy.  The
emergence of DNA evidence is of particular profundity since it can pro-
embarrassingly losing his bid for reelection of Governor of Arkansas in 1980 to Republican
Frank White who accused him of being soft on crime).
42 Ricky Ray Rector, FAMOUS LAST MEALS (Sept. 22, 2010, 8:29 PM), http://www.fa-
mouslastmeals.com/2010/09/ricky-ray-rector.html; see also CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, Chame-
leon in Black and White, in NO ONE LEFT TO LIE TO: THE VALUES OF THE WORST FAMILY 35
(2000).
43 Approximately half of U.S. governors attended law school. See NAT’L GOVERNORS
ASS’N, GOVERNORS OF THE AMERICAN STATES, COMMONWEALTHS AND TERRITORIES (2013),
available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA//pdf/BIOBOOK.PDF (providing infor-
mation on the education of each state’s governor).
44 See, e.g., Tony Anaya, Statement by Toney Anaya on Capital Punishment, 27 U. RICH.
L. REV. 177, 177 (1993) (quoting former governor of New Mexico, who “consistently opposed
capital punishment as being inhumane, immoral, anti-God, and incompatible with an enlight-
ened society”) (emphasis added).
45 See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991) (“In conducting habeas review, a
federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.”); Williams v. Jones, 571 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 2009) (“We
think it axiomatic that the remedy for a properly presented constitutional violation should not
be frustrated by the sentencing options available under state law, but rather should be consis-
tent with federal law.”).
46 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2011) (“The Supreme Court . . . shall entertain an applica-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus . . . only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”).
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vide near definitive proof of innocence after a defendant has been con-
victed and sentenced to death in an otherwise error-free trial.47
The use of DNA evidence to exculpate suspects is by no means new
by today’s standards.  When the Court decided Herrera in 1993, how-
ever, DNA testing was still in its infancy.48  It was not until the mid-to-
late 1990’s that DNA testing emerged as a viable tool for exoneration.49
It is reasonable, therefore, that the Court failed to recognize or discuss
the possibility that DNA evidence could serve as overwhelming proof
that a defendant’s claim of innocence was more than just persuasive.
Nevertheless, the Court’s failure to foresee the rise of DNA evidence
represents a fatal flaw in its discussion of freestanding claims of actual
innocence.  The Court even reasoned that relying on habeas corpus as a
venue for retrials was unreliable due to the significant passage of time,
the fading of memories and the degradation of evidence.50  While this is
true for many types of evidence, including witness testimony and physi-
cal evidence, DNA evidence is an important exception to the rule.  Al-
though the degradation of physical evidence may lead to unreliable DNA
results, DNA evidence can remain pristine and accurate for a number of
years if the biological material is properly stored.51
Even though Herrera’s innocence claim was not based on DNA evi-
dence, the Court’s failure to address the issue while analyzing actual in-
nocence claims is striking evidence that the Court failed to consider the
advances in the field and the impact it would have on proving innocence.
47 See Melissa Duncan, Finding a Constitutional Right to Access DNA Evidence: Post-
conviction, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 519, 522 (2009) (“[T]he reliability of DNA evidence will
permit it to exonerate some people who would have been wrongfully accused or convicted
without it.” (quoting NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNO-
CENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996))); Jennifer Eckroth, Tainted DNA Evidence and Post-conviction
Reversals in Houston, Texas: Suggested Solutions to Curb DNA Evidence Abuse, 31 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 433, 437 (2004) (describing the accuracy of DNA evidence).
48 See Garrett, supra note 26, at 1658–59. R
49 See id. at 1669.
50 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403–04 (1993) (“[W]hen a habeas petitioner
succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the erosion of memory and dispersion of witnesses that occur
with the passage of time prejudice the government and diminish the chances of a reliable
criminal adjudication.” (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
51 See Amy Dunn, Criminal Law—Statutes of Limitation on Sexual Assault Crimes: Has
the Availability of DNA Evidence Rendered Them Obsolete?, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
839, 860 (2001) (“Both the accuracy and longevity of DNA evidence are far superior to that of
any other type of evidence . . . .”); see Rich Phillips, Florida Man Exonerated, Freed from
Prison After 35 Years, CNN (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/16/florida.
dna.exoneration/.html (describing how DNA evidence was used to exonerate a falsely-con-
victed prisoner); New DNA Testing Frees Convicted Colorado Rapist, Killer, NBCNEWS (Apr.
30, 2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/04/30/-new-dna-testing-frees-convicted-
colorado-rapist-killer?lite (describing how DNA evidence was used to exonerate a prisoner
after more than sixteen years in jail).
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The Herrera Court’s failure to foresee the rise of DNA evidence indi-
cates that they were perhaps unable to conceptualize a truly persuasive
case of actual innocence.  This would explain why the Court merely as-
sumed that a strong showing of innocence would render a defendant’s
execution unconstitutional.  Data since Herrera shows that DNA evi-
dence has played a significant role in the upward trend of exonerations
each year.52  In 1993, there were less than five exonerations by way of
DNA.53  In each subsequent year since, there have been at least five
DNA exonerations, with most years ranging between fifteen and twenty-
five.54
C. Lower Court Rulings on Actual Innocence
Since Herrera, courts have adopted varying approaches to claims of
actual innocence.  Some circuits continue to insist that there can be no
habeas relief based solely on a claim of actual innocence.55  Still, many
other courts support, at least in theory, a freestanding claim of actual
innocence despite the availability of state court remedies.56
In Felker v. Turpin, the court recognized two distinct reasons for
denying the petitioner’s habeas claim.57  First, the petitioner had failed to
52 See Fact Sheets, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php# (last visited Nov. 2, 2013) (claiming that there have
been 311 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the United States, 244 of them occurring since
2000).
53 See DNA Exoneree Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/know/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2013).
54 See id.
55 See, e.g., Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Because federal habeas
relief exists to correct constitutional defects, not factual errors, ‘[c]laims of actual innocence
based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas
relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal
proceeding.’” (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400)); Graves v. Cockrell, 351 F.3d 143, 151 (5th
Cir. 2003) (“The Fifth Circuit has . . . held that claims of actual innocence are not cognizable
on federal habeas review.”); United States v. Evans, 224 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2000) (“We
know from Herrera v. Collins that a conviction does not violate the Constitution (or become
otherwise subject to collateral attack) just because newly discovered evidence implies that the
defendant is innocent.”).
56 See, e.g., Robinson v. Dinwiddie, No. CIV-07-432-D, 2009 WL 2778657, at *5 (W.D.
Okla. Aug. 31, 2009) (“Even if a freestanding actual innocence claim in a non-capital case
were cognizable in a federal habeas action, a review of the record demonstrates that Petitioner
has failed to make the required ‘extraordinarily high’ showing.” (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at
417)); Tomlinson v. Burt, 509 F. Supp. 2d 771, 776 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (“While the Supreme
Court did not clearly articulate the quantum of proof necessary for a claim based solely on
actual innocence . . . , it is evident that such claims require that the court be ‘convinced that
those new facts unquestionably establish [the defendant’s] innocence.’” (citing Schlup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 317 (1995))); In re Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 817 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We likewise
have recognized the possibility of freestanding actual innocence claims . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
57 See Felker v. Turpin, 83 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 1996)
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pursue all of the state remedies that were available to him.58  This argu-
ment is similar to the one adopted in Royal.59  However, the court also
recognized that petitioner’s actual innocence claim “failed to persua-
sively demonstrate his actual innocence.”60  Reliance on both the availa-
bility of state court remedies and the failure to raise a truly persuasive
claim of innocence suggests that the court was willing to consider a free-
standing claim of actual innocence, even if state remedies failed to pro-
vide relief.  The availability of state clemency, therefore, would not
prevent a petitioner from relief if the petitioner presented a truly persua-
sively claim of actual innocence.61
Several other recent cases come to a similar conclusion.  At first,
these courts state that they cannot grant relief based on freestanding
claims of actual innocence.62  The courts then go on to assume, however,
that a truly persuasive claim of actual innocence may warrant relief, but
that defendants failed to meet the high standard.63
58 Id.
59 See Royal, 188 F.3d at 253.
60 Felker, 83 F.3d at 1312.
61 Even assuming that actual innocence can provide an independent basis of relief, a
widely debated topic is what the threshold showing must be to succeed on a claim of actual
innocence. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 442 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing for a “probably is innocent” standard); Garrett, supra note 26, at 1636–37 (“The R
Court’s ‘more likely than not’ standard in Schlup already provides a logical standard of review
for [an actual innocence] claim.”).  Most courts that have recognized actual innocence claims
rely on Herrera’s “truly persuasive” standard. See White v. Keane, 51 F. Supp. 2d 495, 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *30 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24,
2010) (“The consensus among the states appears to be that a truly persuasive demonstration of
innocence subsequent to trial renders punishment unconstitutional.”).  Some courts, however,
have evinced a slightly different standard. See Enoch v. Gramley, 861 F. Supp. 718, 731 (C.D.
Ill. 1994) (“Upon reviewing the evidence presented by Petitioner as well as the record as a
whole, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to show that in light of all the evidence, he is
probably innocent.”); Marino v. Miller, No. 97-CV-2001(JG), 2002 WL 2003211, at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2002) (adopting a fundamental fairness test).  Although this is outside the
realm of this Note, any standard evinced by the Court would have to be a relatively high one to
balance the values of comity and finality. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.  That being said, new
DNA evidence tending to show one’s innocence would almost certainly meet any standard that
the Court expresses.
62 See Garcia v. Cash, No. EDCV 11-1869 GAF FFM, 2013 WL 1010368 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 29, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, No. EDCV 11-1869 GAF FFM, 2013
WL 1087350 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013); Pringle v. Runnels, No. 07cv1960-LAB POR, 2011
WL 129427 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011) certificate of appealability denied, 767 F. Supp. 2d 1142
(S.D. Cal. 2011) (“[I]t is doubtful whether Herrera actually permits habeas petitioners to bring
stand-alone claims of actual innocence in non-capital cases.”); Nixon v. McQuiggin, No. 2:10-
CV-14652, 2012 WL 5471146 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2012), report and recommendation
adopted No. 10-14652, 2012 WL 5471128 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2012).
63 See Garcia, 2013 WL 1010368, report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL
1087350; Pringle, 2011 WL 129427, at *2 (“Assuming [a freestanding actual innocence claim
to be possible,]. . . the standard would be ‘extraordinarily high,’ and a petitioner must demon-
strate that he is probably innocent.” (citing Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476–77 (9th Cir.
1997) (en banc)); McQuiggin, 2012 WL 5471146, at *7 report and recommendation adopted,
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The advancements in DNA technology call into question the under-
lying basis of Herrera.  This is not only evident in the major advances in
DNA technology, but also in the Herrera decision itself, where the court
was unwilling to foreclose the possibility of truly persuasive claim of
actual innocence serving as the basis for habeas corpus relief.  Courts
that have addressed freestanding claims of actual innocence are far from
agreement.  While some courts still insist that actual innocence cannot
serve as the basis of habeas corpus relief, they generally rely on the
availability of state court remedies.  However, as discussed above, such
reasoning is questionable because the availability of, for example, state
clemency, is far from a legal remedy.  Furthermore, state clemency
would not necessarily cure a federal constitutional deficiency.  Indeed,
courts recognize that even if state clemency is a remedy for actual inno-
cence, a truly persuasive case of actual innocence would still provide a
basis for habeas corpus relief.
III. AVENUES OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Even if actual innocence could serve as the basis for habeas corpus
relief, on what part of the Constitution could an actual innocence claim
be based?  The need for an underlying constitutional violation is a thresh-
old requirement for federal habeas relief.64  Scholars have made several
suggestions.  In the following Part, I explore several of them.
A. Habeas Corpus Under the Constitution
The Constitution states, “The Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.”65  Commonly referred to as the Suspension
Clause, this is the source of constitutional habeas.  Constitutional habeas
dates back to early England and the Magna Carta.66  The purpose was to
ensure that “no person could be imprisoned or punished ‘excepting by
2012 WL 5471128 (“[E]ven if such a claim were cognizable, petitioner’s evidence falls far
short of that necessary to establish that he is innocent.”).
64 See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (“[New] evidence must bear upon
the constitutionality of the applicant’s detention; the existence merely of newly discovered
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas
corpus.”); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87–88 (1923) (noting that habeas claims deal with
“not the petitioners’ innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional
rights have been preserved”).
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
66 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 552 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring) (“[W]e are
heirs to a tradition given voice 800 years ago by Magna Carta, which, on the barons’ insis-
tence, confined executive power by ‘the law of the land.’”).
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the legal judgment of his peers, or by the laws of the land.’”67  Constitu-
tional habeas, therefore, gives the courts the power to call upon the jailor
to explain the legal basis for a prisoner’s detention.68  Substantively, it
protects citizens from attempts by the executive to imprison people with-
out a basis in the law.69
Even though the Great Writ is viewed as “the best and only suffi-
cient defense of personal freedom,”70 there has been significant disagree-
ment as to whether there is any affirmative guarantee of habeas corpus
under the Suspension Clause.71  At times, the Court had determined that
the wording of the Suspension Clause does not guarantee an affirmative
right to habeas relief; rather, it simply provides a negative command to
Congress.72  If there is no affirmative guarantee of habeas corpus under
the Constitution, relief can only come through congressional acts.73
While the Court confirmed this interpretation in Ex Parte Bollman,74 it
has recently reversed course by reading an affirmative right to habeas
corpus into the Suspension Clause.75
Even if constitutional habeas does provide affirmative protection,
there is a more fundamental flaw with relying on it as a basis for state
67 See Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 61
(2012).
68 See Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. 448, 452 (1806) (“The question is, what authority has the
jailor to detain him?”); Kovarsky, supra note 13, at 10 (“[H]abeas process is an Article III R
power of judges over jailors, not an individual right of prisoners.”).
69 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008) (“That the Framers considered the
writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual liberty is evident from the care taken to
specify the limited grounds for its suspension.”); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (“[T]he Great Writ of
habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate
balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in
the realm of detentions.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Juris-
diction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2007)
(“The Great Writ of habeas corpus is the procedural mechanism through which courts have
insisted that neither the King, the President, nor any other executive official may impose de-
tention except as authorized by law.”).
70 See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 95 (1868); see also WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 3 (1980).
71 Compare David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another
View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 64 (2006) (viewing the Great Writ as an affirmative right),
with RICHARD FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1369 (4th ed. 1996) (noting that the Suspension Clause “does not confer a right to
habeas relief, but merely sets forth when the ‘Privilege of the Writ’ may be suspended”).
72 See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A straightfor-
ward reading of [the Suspension Clause] discloses that it does not guarantee any content to (or
even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not
(except in case of rebellion or invasion) be suspended.”).
73 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807).
74 Id. at 94 (“[T]he power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United States,
must be given by written law.”).
75 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); see generally Gerald L. Neuman, The
Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 537,
548–557 (2010) (addressing the innovations to the Suspension Clause after Boumediene).
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prisoners’ claims of actual innocence.  Constitutional habeas was never
understood to provide a basis for collateral review of state prisoners.76
Since constitutional habeas corpus derives its remedial power from the
Suspension Clause, the scope of protection would be similar to what it
was intended to protect at the time of passage.77  The exact scope of the
Suspension Clause is still debated today.  While some argue that the pro-
tection provided by the Suspension Clause would only extend to what
was protected at the time of ratification, the Court (and scholars) have
appeared willing to expand the Suspension Clause’s scope of
protection.78
Even if the Suspension Clause is broadly interpreted today, the core
of its protection was understood to protect citizens from unlawful execu-
tive detention.79  It is unlikely that the Suspension Clause could be read
to protect state prisoners on collateral review after receiving a fair state
trial.80  Aside from this being inconsistent with an historical reading of
the Suspension Clause, there would be practical obstacles in interpreting
the Suspension Clause to extend to collateral review of state proceedings.
For one, statutory grants of habeas corpus jurisdiction would act only to
expand and never to contract jurisdiction.  This is because once habeas
corpus jurisdiction is granted, say under a provision like § 2254, Con-
gress may only suspend the jurisdictional grant in times of rebellion or
invasion.81  This would unduly handcuff Congress’ power to legislate.82
Ultimately, it is more consistent to view habeas corpus review of state
prisoners as “a purely statutory remedy that is fundamentally different
from the traditional habeas corpus remedy whose suspension is prohib-
ited by the Constitution.”83
76 See Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report to the Attorney General on
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Judgments, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 901, 903 (1989)
[hereinafter Report to the Attorney General].
77 See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301 (“[A]t the absolute minimum, the Suspension Clause
protects the writ as it existed in 1789.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (“The Court has been careful not to foreclose the
possibility that the protections of the Suspension Clause have expanded along with post-1789
developments that define the present scope of the writ.”).
79 See supra note 69. R
80 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *132 (“[C]onfinement of the person, by
secretly hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a
less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.”).
81 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
82 See District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 114 (1953) (“The
repeal of laws is as much a legislative function as their enactment.”).
83 Report to the Attorney General, supra note 76, at 903.  Further proof of constitutional R
habeas’ original purpose is its placement in the Constitution in Section 9 of Article 1, an
enumeration of federal limitations of government power, rather than in Section 10 of Article 1,
an enumeration of state limitations of government power. See id. at 918–19. See also Henry J.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L.
REV. 142, 172 (1970).
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B. Right to Jury Trial
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that all defendants subjected to a
criminal trial have the right to be tried by a jury.84  In Apprendi v. New
Jersey, the Court held that a jury must find all elements of a crime be-
yond a reasonable doubt in order to convict a defendant.85  This right
applies not only to the punishment phase of a trial, but to the sentencing
phase as well.86  A defendant seeking habeas relief for a freestanding
claim of actual innocence would presumably argue that his state court
conviction violated the Sixth Amendment as follows: a jury fails to find
all the elements of a crime (for which the defendant was convicted) be-
yond a reasonable doubt when those findings are based on an incomplete
or erroneous set of facts.  Since any new and relevant facts that come to
light after trial (i.e., DNA evidence) could presumably raise reasonable
doubt among the jury, the defendant’s right to a jury trial was not
fulfilled.
This constitutional avenue also has several flaws.  First, the failure
of the jury to hear all relevant evidence does not always guarantee that a
court will find a violation of a defendant’s jury right.  Indeed, where a
defense attorney makes a strategic choice to withhold evidence from the
jury, the fact that the jury did not have the opportunity to consider that
evidence does not represent a per se violation of the defendant’s jury
right.87
Second, the temporal restraints implied by the Sixth Amendment
may prove to be a roadblock for defendants.  That is, the Sixth Amend-
ment only requires that a jury find all elements of a crime beyond a
reasonable doubt as they existed at the time of trial. Like due process,
there is an implied temporal relationship between the violation of the
right and the cause of that violation.88  Where claims of freestanding ac-
tual innocence are involved, the defendant received a fair trial at the time
of conviction and sentencing.
Lastly, the Sixth Amendment fails to encompass the nature of the
constitutional violation at issue in claims of freestanding actual inno-
cence.  The right to a jury trial is intended to serve the interests of fair-
ness and reliability, values that have “always outweighed the interest in
84 U.S. CONST. amend VI.
85 See 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000).
86 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  In Ring v. Arizona, the Court found that
capital defendants were entitled to a trial by jury, and also for that jury to “find an aggravating
circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty.” Id. at 609.
87 See, e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (noting that a defense council’s decision to
concede guilt at the guilt phase of trial without express consent of defendant is not always
automatic reversible error).
88 See infra note 101–102 and accompanying text. R
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concluding trials swiftly.”89  A defendant claiming that he is actually in-
nocent is not claiming that he has received an unfair trial, but claiming
that the verdict is unreliable due to newly discovered evidence.  In es-
sence, the failure of the jury to consider newly discovered evidence cre-
ates the possibility of reasonable doubt.  But the jury right is intended to
“‘guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,’”
and is seen “‘as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political liber-
ties.’”90  The jury right best serves this purpose by protecting process,
not outcome.  Where claims of actual innocence are involved, however, a
defendant has presumably received a fair trial, but through no fault of the
criminal justice system, ultimately received an unfair verdict.
C. Due Process
Scholars, as well as defendants, have also suggested that freestand-
ing innocence claims could be grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.91  The Due Process Clause provides both proce-
dural and substantive protection.92  Although the procedural and substan-
tive protections often overlap, the Court has analyzed the two doctrines
separately.93
Procedural due process is unlikely to provide the grounds for habeas
corpus relief for a prisoner’s claim of freestanding actual innocence.  For
a procedural due process claim to be meritorious, a convicted prisoner
needs to show that he or she was deprived of a liberty or life interest
without receiving the minimum measure of procedural protection re-
quired by the Constitution.94  Although prisoners claiming innocence can
show that their execution would deprive them of their interest in life,
such deprivation would be viewed as proper from a strictly procedural
due process view, so long as those prisoners received a full and fair trial
on the merits.  Because prisoners who raise freestanding claims of actual
innocence have received trials free of procedural deficiencies, success on
89 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
90 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting 2 J. STORY, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540–41 (4th ed. 1873)).
91 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993); Garcia v. Cash, No. EDCV 11-
1869 GAF (FFM), 2013 WL 1010368 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013) report and recommendation
adopted, No. EDCV 11-1869 GAF (FFM), 2013 WL 1087350 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2013). See
also Kovarsky, supra note 13, at 15–16. R
92 See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994).
93 See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 301 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Four-
teenth Amendment contains only one Due Process Clause. Though it is sometimes helpful, as a
matter of doctrine, to distinguish between substantive and procedural due process, the two
concepts are not mutually exclusive, and their protections often overlap.”).
94 See Humphries v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009) rev’d
and remanded sub nom. Los Angeles Cnty., Cal. v. Humphries, 131 S. Ct. 447, 178 L. Ed. 2d
460 (U.S. 2010).
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procedural due process grounds is unlikely.  Further, the Constitution
does not guarantee, nor does it reference, any right to receive a new
trial.95
The hallmark of the substantive due process analysis is protection
against arbitrary government action.96  Whether it is phrased as arbitrary,
“contrary to contemporary standards of decency,”97 or “shocking to the
conscience,”98 the idea remains the same: if the state action would be so
fundamentally unfair that it would offend a sense of justice, the state has
violated the prisoner’s due process rights.99  A defendant raising a free-
standing claim of actual innocence, therefore, would contend that his ex-
ecution in light of newly discovered evidence proving his innocence
would offend a sense of justice sufficient to violate substantive due
process.
This argument has the benefit of clarity, and many scholars have
advocated for this position.100  However, even if the argument is substan-
tively sound, practical considerations warn against relying on substantive
due process.  First, the Court in Herrera specifically addresses substan-
tive due process, raising a temporal objection against it.101  When ad-
dressing Herrera’s substantive due process claim, the Court stated a
defendant “puts the cart before the horse,” since the defendant’s argu-
ment is premised on his innocence before he has proved his inno-
cence.102  Whether or not a proponent of substantive due process agrees
with this argument, it serves as a significant roadblock that does not exist
for the Eighth Amendment.103
In addition, even if substantive due process has significant appeal,
the Court has consistently held that where a specific constitutional
amendment is on point, the claim should be analyzed under that provi-
95 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407 n.6.
96 See Ursula Bentele, Does the Death Penalty, by Risking Execution of the Innocent,
Violate Substantive Due Process?, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1359, 1367 (2004).
97 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477
U.S. 399, 406 (1986)).
98 Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952)).
99 See Brown v. State of Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–86 (1936).
100 See, e.g., Larry May & Nancy Viner, Actual Innocence and Manifest Injustice, 49 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 481, 482 (2005) (“[D]enying actual innocence claims is a paradigmatic example
of manifest injustice and a denial of substantive due process.”); Sarah A. Mourer, Gateway to
Justice: Constitutional Claims to Actual Innocence, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1279, 1281 (2010)
(“To execute a person with a compelling claim to innocence would also shock the conscience
sufficiently to violate substantive due process.”); Bernard A. Williams, Guilty Until Proven
Innocent: The Tragedy of Habeas Capital Appeals, 18 J.L. & POL. 773, 776 (2002)
(“[E]vidence of actual innocence discovered post-conviction establishes a prima facie Four-
teenth Amendment substantive due process violation.”).
101 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407 n.6.
102 Id.
103 See infra notes 143–144 and accompanying text. R
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sion rather than due process.104  Because the Eighth Amendment pro-
vides a constitutionally concrete basis for review, the courts should not
rely upon substantive due process.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
The Eighth Amendment provides that, “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted.”105  Defendants seeking habeas corpus relief for free-
standing claims of actual innocence have consistently relied on the
Eighth Amendment.106  The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel
and unusual punishment” is intended to protect the “dignity of man,”
recognizing that “the State has the power to punish, [but] . . . that this
power [must] be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”107
Rather than remaining the same from its enactment, the scope of the
Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”108
Scholars that argue that the Eighth Amendment should serve as the
underlying constitutional basis for freestanding claims of actual inno-
cence contend that it is unconstitutional to execute a prisoner who is
actually innocent.109  In essence, a challenge based on the Eighth
Amendment “calls into question the permissibility of capital punishment
based upon a characteristic of the offender: a total lack of culpability,
which is demonstrated through a showing of factual innocence based
upon evidence discovered subsequent to a full and fair trial.”110  To suc-
ceed on this challenge, proponents are first required to show that the
execution of an innocent person would be against the national consensus
based on “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legis-
lative enactments and state practice.”111  Then, guided by its “own under-
standing and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text, history,
meaning, and purpose, the Court must determine in the exercise of its
104 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“Graham simply requires
that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the
Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to
that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”).
105 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.  The Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
675 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
106 See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. 390; In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at
*39–43 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010).
107 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–100 (1958).
108 Id.; see also In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *39–43.
109 See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 108 (2003)
110 In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *40 (footnote omitted).
111 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022 (2010) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 563 (2005)).
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own independent judgment whether the punishment in question violates
the Constitution.”112
In In re Davis, the court found that executing an innocent person is
clearly against the national consensus because state legislatures are near
unanimity in providing prisoners a state avenue to prove that their con-
victions were incorrect.113  This indicates, the court argued, that states
“are showing an increased concern for protecting legally convicted indi-
viduals whom are shown to be factually innocent subsequent to a
trial.”114  Although there are other measures of the national consensus
besides legislation,115 they are difficult to measure. An attempt to com-
pile statistics on the number of actually innocence defendants that have
been executed, for example, would be impossible to accurately assess.116
Regardless of the national consensus, interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment “remains in the hands of the federal courts.”117  As such, the
second step in determining whether the Eighth Amendment has been vio-
lated requires the courts, while keeping in mind the national consensus,
to make a determination of the constitutionality of the punishment at is-
sue.118  Those in favor of relying on the Eighth Amendment to support
freestanding claims of actual innocence point to a long line of Supreme
Court precedent that proscribes punishment of the innocent.119  In addi-
tion, scholars are in near agreement that the execution of the innocent
persons is purposeless, needless, arbitrary, and excessive.120
It is also hard to imagine how executing an innocent person meets
either penological goal of capital punishment.121  The Supreme Court has
long held that the principal penological goals that capital punishment is
intended to serve are deterrence and retribution.122  Although the great
112 See id. (citing Roper 543 U.S. at 563 (2005).
113 See In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *40 n.29–30 (compiling state statutes that
provide for post-conviction procedures to help prove innocence).
114 Id. at *41.
115 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010) (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana,
554 U.S. 407, 433 (2008)).
116 In addition, punishment of an innocent person has long been held to be unconstitu-
tional. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“Even one day in prison would
be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common cold.”).
117 See In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *41 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026).
118 See supra note 112. R
119 See, e.g., In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *41(compiling cases).
120 See, e.g., Sarah A. Mourer, Gateway to Justice: Constitutional Claims to Actual Inno-
cence, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1279, 1308 (2010); Rosen, supra note 109. R
121 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312–13 (White, J., concurring) (noting that
capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment if the execution no longer serves penologi-
cal goals).
122 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, at 420; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
593 (2005); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (“The death penalty is said to serve
two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective
offenders.”).
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bulk of empirical evidence regarding capital punishment’s deterrent im-
pact have been inconclusive,123 the Supreme Court has recognized that
“the death penalty undoubtedly is a significant deterrent” for certain
types of murder, “such as murder for hire, where the possibility of death
may well enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to
act.”124
With respect to retribution, capital punishment is said to be “an ex-
pression of society’s moral outrage at particularly offensive conduct.”125
Although criminal law has long since moved away from retribution as its
primary objective,126 “the decision that capital punishment may be the
appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the commu-
nity’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to
humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of
death.”127
Capital punishment serves neither deterrence nor retribution, how-
ever, when the primary target is a defendant who is factually innocent.
Capital punishment can only serve as a deterrent “when it will send a
message to potential murderers that society will respond harshly to their
actions.”128  Although capital punishment’s deterrent impact is question-
able, there is no doubt that executing a defendant who is actually inno-
cent does not serve to deter future crimes.  In fact, the conviction of the
innocent could lead to a reduced deterrent effect.129
123 Compare H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting Off Death Row: Commuted
Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453, 474 (2003)
(concluding that capital punishment has a deterrent effect), with Peter Passell, The Deterrent
Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. REV. 61, 79 (1975) (concluding that
there is no evidence that capital punishment has a deterrent effect), and Michael L. Radelet &
Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminolo-
gists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 504 (2009) (concluding that the majority of crimi-
nologists believe that the deterrent effect of capital punishment is a myth).
124 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185–86.
125 Id. at 183.  However, it is important to note that the “value of retributive punish-
ment . . . is internal to its practice and is not contingent upon the achievement of some future
benefit to others outside the relationship of punisher and punished.” Dan Markel, Executing
Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163,
1176 n.53 (2009).  In other words, a defendant is punished not to benefit society, but to ensure
that the defendant receives his just deserts. See id. at 1180; Joshua Dressler, Hating
Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1448,
1451 (1990)
126 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)).
127 Id. at 184.
128 Lawrence A. Vanore, The Decency of Capital Punishment for Minors: Contemporary
Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757, 766 (1986).
129 See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35
CONN. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (2003) (arguing that the increased incarceration of the innocent
may lead to an overall reduction of incarceration’s deterrent effect).
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Moreover, theories of positive and negative retributivism “decr[y]
the punishment of an innocent person.”130  While positive retributivists
argue that “an innocent person [must] never be punished,” negative re-
tributivists take the stronger view “that it is morally wrong to punish an
innocent person even if society might benefit from the action.”131  The
execution of a prisoner who persuasively argues innocence would there-
fore be counter to either theory of retribution.
On a more intuitive level, the execution of an innocent person in
light of persuasive evidence of his innocence feels offensive to basic no-
tions of fairness protected by the Constitution.  This is evident in the
Herrera opinion itself, where the Court, in addressing the Eighth
Amendment claim, focused on policy interests in finality and comity
rather than attempting to make a substantive argument supporting the
execution of the innocent.132  Instead, the Court declined to argue the
merits, holding that Herrera sought to relitigate the guilt-innocence ques-
tion—a question that was not appropriate for habeas review.133
By assuming arguendo that a truly persuasive claim of innocence
would provide the basis for habeas corpus relief, however, the majority
failed to completely ignore the merits.134  This assumption, even if just
dicta, suggests that the Court, at the very least, did not foreclose the
possibility of actual innocence serving as the basis for habeas corpus
review.  For if defendants were truly unable to relitigate the guilt-inno-
cence question during habeas review, then there would be no need for an
arguendo assumption, because new evidence of innocence would never
serve as the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation.135  Instead, the
Court hedged, seemingly to avoid completely foreclosing the possibility
of a freestanding claim of actual innocence serving as the basis for
habeas relief.136
Although it is speculative, the Court would likely be willing to find
a truly persuasive case of innocence violative of the Eighth Amendment.
As Justice O’Connor stated in concurrence, “the execution of a legally
130 Judith M. Barger, Innocence Found: Retribution, Capital Punishment, and the Eighth
Amendment, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 15 (2012).
131 Dressler, supra note 125, at 1451.
132 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).
133 Id.at 393; see Kathleen Callahan, In Limbo: In re Davis and the Future of Herrera
Innocence Claims in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 641 (2011).
134 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400–01.
135 See id. This is the sum and substance of Justice Scalia’s concurrence; he mocks the
majority’s discrepancy, but nevertheless concurs. See id. at 428–29 (Scalia, J., concurring).
136 See generally id. Assuming procedural soundness, the substantive argument against
the Eighth Amendment claim is more difficult to express.  That is, executing an actually inno-
cent person is neither cruel nor unusual.  It is hard for one to rationally make this argument
because it would entail admitting that a prisoner, who is in fact innocent, is nevertheless
executable.
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and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable
event.”137  Indeed, when totaling the number of Justices in favor of relief
for one claiming actual innocence, six Justices showed some support for
a truly persuasive claim of actual innocence.138
Ultimately, relying on the Eighth Amendment as the underlying ba-
sis for habeas corpus relief has other benefits.  For one, the Eighth
Amendment is designed to protect categories of crimes or defendants,
which makes it well-suited to protect the innocent or falsely accused.139
As an example, the Supreme Court has found that the death penalty is an
excessive punishment for any defendant convicted of rape.140  Similarly,
the Court has found that the death penalty is an inappropriate punishment
for juveniles.141
Protection of categories of defendants makes the Eighth Amend-
ment uniquely suited to protect the innocent or falsely accused.  Actu-
ally-innocent defendants can be viewed as a category of defendants.
Like juveniles, actually innocent defendants share a common characteris-
tic unique to other defendants.  That is, there is persuasive evidence of
their innocence.  Furthermore, because the death penalty is only reserved
“for a narrow category of crimes and offenders,”142 those with persuasive
evidence of their innocence cannot be said to fall within that narrow
category.
In addition to protecting categories of defendants, the Eighth
Amendment does not have the same temporal limits that due process and
the Sixth Amendment share.  The Eighth Amendment protects a defen-
dant from execution even if the defendant does not fall into a protected
category until after conviction.  For example, defendants who become
mentally incompetent after their conviction may not be executed if their
incompetence makes them “unaware of the punishment they are about to
137 Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring).
138 See id. (“[T]he execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a consti-
tutionally intolerable event.”); id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (“[A] persuasive showing of
‘actual innocence’ made after trial . . . would render unconstitutional the execution of [a fed-
eral habeas petitioner].”); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissent-
ing) (“Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary standards of decency or more
shocking to the conscience . . . than to execute a person who is actually innocent.”) (citations
omitted).
139 See Lee Kovarsky, Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329,
330 (2010) (noting that the Supreme Court has recently used the Eighth Amendment to declare
“several categories of prisoners . . . to be categorically ineligible for capital punishment . . . “).
140 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).  The death penalty
has also been found excessive for “mere participation in a robbery during which a killing takes
place.” Herrera, 506 U.S. at 431 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982)).
141 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).  Similarly, in Atkins v. Virginia, the
Court concluded that “death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded criminal.”
536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
142 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
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suffer and why they are to suffer it.”143  Of course, “[t]he State . . . may
properly presume that petitioner remains sane at the time sentence is to
be carried out, and may require a substantial threshold showing of in-
sanity merely to trigger the hearing process.”144  There nevertheless re-
mains protection from execution under the Eighth Amendment if the
defendant can overcome the presumption in favor of sanity.
Like mental incompetence occurring after a conviction, a freestand-
ing claim of actual innocence involves a claim that could not be substan-
tiated until after a conviction.  Defendants seeking habeas relief based
solely on actual innocence do not suffer from ineffective counsel or bad
strategic choices at trial, but from the inability to discover the requisite
evidence to prove their innocence.  If such evidence comes to light,
though, those defendants join a category of defendants protected by the
Eighth Amendment. Of course, unlike defendants suffering from mental
incompetence, defendants claiming that they are actually innocent fully
understand the punishment they are receiving.  However, the similarity
between defendants claiming incompetence and defendants claiming in-
nocence is not one that depends on the characteristics of particular de-
fendants, but rather on the category of defendants.  That is, even though
defendants claiming incompetence and defendants claiming innocence
are different in many ways, as a category, they share an important like-
ness: both types of defendants rely on facts that, through no fault of their
own, were unavailable at the time of trial and which should make them
ineligible for the death penalty.
CONCLUSION
The law surrounding freestanding claims of actual innocence is still
very much in flux.  Because the Court failed to provide a clear rule in
Herrera, lower courts have failed to come to any sort of consensus on
how to deal with freestanding claims of actual innocence.  That being
said, twenty years have passed since the Court’s decision in Herrera.  A
lot has changed since then, and advancements in DNA technology appear
to provide a scenario under which actual innocence may be persuasively
presented.  Although there are a number of constitutional provisions that
a defendant presenting a persuasive case of actual innocence may rely
upon as the basis for habeas corpus relief, the Eighth Amendment is the
clearest and most logical choice.
This is certainly not the end of the debate.  Even if those claiming
actual innocence are granted relief from capital punishment based on an
Eighth Amendment analysis, questions remain as to the proper remedy.
143 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
144 Id. at 426.
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Courts that implicitly recognize actual innocence claims have never
enunciated a standard.145  Further, if capital defendants are permitted to
present freestanding claims of actual innocence, what should stop other
defendants from doing so?146  The Court certainly has frowned upon the
imprisonment of innocent persons, even contending that “one day in
prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of hav-
ing a common cold.”147  Needless to say, there is still a lot to be decided,
and further work will be necessary to answer these questions.  However,
the first step is for the Court to explicitly recognize a freestanding claim
of actual innocence for capital defendants.
145 In most capital cases in which the Court has found violations of the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Court has chosen to set aside the sentence and leave the conviction intact. See, e.g.,
Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (2002); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 600 (1977) (reversing the Georgia Supreme Court’s upholding of the death sentence,
only).  However, because life imprisonment is so disproportionate to a defendant’s innocence,
such a result would appear to implicate a continuing Eighth Amendment violation. See infra
note 140. As such, one can argue that the only proper remedy could be immediate release and
a new trial.
146 An argument for applying the above analysis only to capital cases is to rely upon the
age-old adage that death is different. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986)
(“This especial concern is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most
irremediable and unfathomable of penalties; that death is different.”); Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991).  Indeed, the Court has previously held that because of death’s
finality and solemnity, it has “imposed protections that the Constitution nowhere else pro-
vides.” Id.  That being said, the Eighth Amendment is not toothless when it comes to non-
capital cases.  Even though “the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of
legislative prerogative,” id. at 962 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980)),
there still remains a general principle of proportionality that must be applied.  Another argu-
ment against applying the Eighth Amendment to non-capital cases is that doing so would result
in overloaded federal dockets, and fail to give proper deference to state courts.  Ultimately,
whether the above analysis would apply to noncapital cases requires further discussion.
147 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
